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Abstract. This article measures overall, allocative, technical, pure technical and scale
efﬁciency levels for a sample of residential real estate brokerage ﬁrms using data
envelopment analysis, a linear-programming technique. The results suggest that real
estate brokerage ﬁrms operate inefﬁciently. Inefﬁciencies are primarily a function of sub-
optimal input allocations and the failure to operate at constant returns to scale rather
than from poor input utilization. Regression analysis is employed to determine which
ﬁrm and/or market characteristics affect efﬁciency levels. The results show that
increasing ﬁrm size increases efﬁciency while choosing to franchise, adding an additional
multiple listing service and increasing operating leverage decreases ﬁrm performance.
Introduction
Over the last decade the market for real estate brokerage services has experienced
many signiﬁcant changes. One of the important changes is that today, the residential
real estate brokerage industry consists of fewer, but larger ﬁrms. In fact, between 1979
and 1996 the percentage of large ﬁrms (with ﬁfty or more employees) making up the
industry’s total workforce has risen from 29% to 68% (NAR, 1996). Most of this
increase has come at the expense of smaller ﬁrms through mergers, consolidations
and failures. The market efﬁciency implications of these changes are important. If
larger ﬁrms are more efﬁcient, the movement towards consolidation should continue,
barring regulatory intervention. If ﬁrms become less efﬁcient as ﬁrm size increases,
further consolidation should be viewed with concern in a marketplace with few
barriers to entry and exit.
The market has also undergone structural changes. New market arrangements are
arising, such as buyer’s agency, disclosed dual agency, facilitators and other non-
agency brokerage contracts. The market is also relying more heavily on interactive
multimedia marketing arrangements such as the Internet and e-mail to complement
the traditional use of the multiple listing service (MLS). These changes are likely to
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alter product mix and competitiveness in the market, which will, in turn, affect ﬁrm
performance and efﬁciency levels.
The lack of usable data has hindered empirical research on ﬁrm performance in the
residential real estate brokerage industry. There are currently only two studies that
directly address the efﬁciency issues described earlier (Zumpano, Elder and Crellin,
1993; and Zumpano and Elder, 1994). These studies indicate that most ﬁrms in the
industry are too small to take full advantage of economies of scale. In addition,
product mix is found to be important. Zumpano and Elder found the presence of
signiﬁcant economies of scope, which suggests that ﬁrms are most efﬁcient when they
produce a balanced output of both sales and listings.
While these two studies provide a good starting point for addressing ﬁrm efﬁciency
questions, additional information is needed. Traditional cost studies assume that all
ﬁrms are operating on their efﬁcient frontier.1 Tests of this assumption in other sectors
have revealed that most ﬁrms operate, to differing degrees, off their efﬁcient frontier.
Termed X-inefﬁciencies, these deviations from the efﬁcient frontier have been shown
to harm ﬁrm performance even more severely than failure to operate in a manner that
optimizes economies of scale or scope (Berger, Hunter and Timme, 1993). Hence, the
validity of this assumption should be examined for the residential real estate market.
It is also important to analyze the sources of these X-inefﬁciencies should they be
found to exist in this market in order to better understand ﬁrm performance.
This article addresses these concerns by estimating X-inefﬁciency levels for a set of
residential real estate brokerage ﬁrms using a technique called the data envelopment
analysis (DEA). This approach allows us to quantify overall efﬁciency levels as well
as decompose this measure into its allocative, technical, pure technical and scale
efﬁciency components. Subsequently, a regression analysis is used to identify what
ﬁrm and/or market conditions inﬂuence the estimated efﬁciency levels.
The second section is a literature review. The third section discusses efﬁciency
determination. The fourth section presents the efﬁciency results. The ﬁfth section
discusses ﬁrm characteristics and efﬁciency measures. The sixth section presents
regression results and the ﬁnal section is the conclusion.
Literature Review
Examination of Early Efﬁciency Studies
Although the performance of the market for residential real estate brokerage services
has been under examination for many years, data problems have limited most studies
to theoretical models or indirect tests of market efﬁciency.
Many of the early studies argue that this market is inefﬁcient. Yinger’s (1981)
theoretical study suggests that the market is operationally inefﬁcient and suffers from
excess capacity. Others characterize the market as a cartel2 where various types of
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Miller and Shedd (1979) and Crockett (1982) argue that the industry can be
characterized as monopolistic where ﬁrms can differentiate their products and realize
short-run excess proﬁts. Wachter (1985) argues that the percentage commission
structure used in this market is a form of price discrimination and market imperfection.
Conversely, other early studies imply that this market is relatively efﬁcient. Schroeter
(1987) and Knoll (1988) develop different arguments that suggest that the commission
structure in the market is consistent with market efﬁciency when transaction time is
considered. Carroll (1989) argue that the percentage commission structure reduces
agency costs and helps promote market efﬁciency. With all of these differing opinions,
Zumpano and Hooks (1988) note a need to resolve this issue by directly examining
the underlying production function for ﬁrms in this industry.
There exists a vast literature on economies of scale, scope and X-inefﬁciencies for
other industries such as public utilities, transportation, manufacturing, banking, health
care and law enforcement.3 The comparable data needed for research of the residential
real estate industry has only recently become available.
Production and Cost Studies
Zumpano, Elder and Crellin (1993) conducted the ﬁrst study of production costs and
economies of scale for the residential brokerage market. Using a single output translog
cost function, the authors found that residential ﬁrms have average cost curves that
are generally U-shaped. This study also found that many ﬁrms were too small to
effectively take advantage of scale economies.
Seeking to determine why ﬁrm size was so small in the presence of positive scale
economies, Zumpano and Elder (1994) estimate economies of scale and scope for the
residential real estate market using a multi-product translog function. They essentially
ﬁnd the same U-shaped average cost curves for total output, but only decreasing
returns to scale when product-speciﬁc economies of scale are measured separately for
listing and sales. Once ﬁrms get large enough, agents can specialize in listing or sales
activities and better utilize sharable inputs. By allowing the ﬁrm to efﬁciently produce
more of both goods, economies of scale can be achieved by a balanced production
mix. In effect, the presence of scope economies allows ﬁrms to achieve economies of
scale in production.
The Importance and Meaning of X-Inefﬁciencies
Previous studies in real estate have not examined why, and the degree to which, ﬁrms
deviate from their efﬁcient frontier.4 Leibenstein (1966) was the ﬁrst to recognize and
formally deﬁne the term X-inefﬁciency. At the heart of his deﬁnition is the realization
that ﬁrms can operate suboptimally for two reasons. The ﬁrst is the failure to allocate
resources in the most efﬁcient manner or allocative inefﬁciency. The second is related
to a ﬁrm’s ability to utilize its resources given their allocation (technical inefﬁciency).
In other words, two ﬁrms may have the exact same resource allocation, yet one ﬁrm
produces less output than the other. The difference between how a ﬁrm could142 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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potentially utilize its resources versus its actual utilization was termed X-inefﬁciency.
Leibenstein argues that the majority of X-inefﬁciency losses arise from inadequate
motivation by ﬁrm management. He also suggests that motivation levels are linked to
the structure and competitiveness of the market.5
More recent studies generally discuss X-inefﬁciency in somewhat more technical
terms. X-inefﬁciency is usually deﬁned as deviations from an efﬁcient frontier
response surface that is attributable to a misallocation of resources or the lack of
effective utilization of current resources; in other words, allocative and technical
inefﬁciencies.
To measure ﬁrm efﬁciency, this article employs DEA approach. The DEA is a linear-
programming procedure that measures the relative efﬁciency level of any economic




Farrell (1957) ﬁrst suggests the use of the DEA to examine efﬁciency. The work by
Fa ¨re, Grosskopf and Lovell (1985) further promoted the usefulness of DEA. Since
then, many efﬁciency studies in other sectors have employed this technique. Within
the DEA framework, performance of an individual ﬁrm is evaluated with respect to
an efﬁcient frontier, which is constructed by linear combinations of existing ﬁrms.
There are several approaches to measure efﬁciency. This study employs the input-
based approach where inputs are contracted proportionally with exogenous outputs.
While the procedure is computationally rigorous, a simple graphical depiction can
demonstrate how the methodology works and how the efﬁciency measures are
obtained. Exhibit 1 displays the overall (OE), technical (TE) and allocative (AE)
efﬁciency measures. There are two inputs (X1 and X2), one output (Y) and constant
returns to scale. Technology is ﬁxed and PP represents the cost if a ﬁrm had been
technically and allocatively efﬁcient. Suppose a ﬁrm operating at c (say ﬁrm C)
produces an output equivalent to that produced along YY. C is said to be both
technically and allocatively inefﬁcient. Assuming that input allocations are ﬁxed, the
best that ﬁrm C would have done technically was to operate at b. As the ﬁrm moves
from c to b, it can reduce its inputs proportionally while maintaining the current output
level. The TE of ﬁrm C is expressed as ob/oc. ob indicates the input usage for the
best practice ﬁrm while oc is the input combination used by ﬁrm C. The extra input
usage that was incurred by ﬁrm C as a percentage of total input usage is expressed
as bc/oc (1 2 ob/oc). In other words, ﬁrm C could reduce inputs proportionally by
bc/oc percent and still produce an output level indicated by YY. Notice that as a ﬁrm
becomes technically efﬁcient, the efﬁciency measure equals one (i.e., ob/ob). When
the technical efﬁciency measure is equal to one, the ﬁrm can no longer reduce its
input combinations without reducing its output level.MEASURING THE EFFICIENCY OF RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE FIRMS 143
Exhibit 1
Overall, Technical, and Allocative Efﬁciencies
Even if the ﬁrm operates at b at which no resources are wasted, the ﬁrm is allocatively
inefﬁcient. It is inefﬁcient because the ﬁrm is not choosing the optimal input mix.
The budget line PP represents the cost if the ﬁrm had been allocatively efﬁcient.
However, the actual cost of production when ﬁrm C became technically efﬁcient is
represented by P9P9. AE for ﬁrm C is thus expressed as od/ob. db/ob (1 2 od/ob)
represents the percentage of inputs that can be reduced if the ﬁrm chose the optimal
input mix. OE is equal to the product of AE and TE. Therefore, for ﬁrm C, the overall
efﬁciency measure is equal to od/oc (ob/oc*od/ob). This ratio is simply a measure
of the cost of the best practice ﬁrm divided by a ﬁrm’s actual production cost. In
Exhibit 1, a ﬁrm operating at a attains overall efﬁciency; that is, it does not waste
any resources and employs the optimal input mix.
TE can be decomposed further into a pure technical (PTE) and scale (SE) measures.
PTE simply refers to deviations from the efﬁcient frontier that result from failure to
utilize the employed resources efﬁciently, allowing variable returns to scale. SEs, on
the other hand, are losses due to failure to operate at the long-run optimal scale
(constant returns to scale). Exhibit 2 illustrates these two efﬁciency measures.144 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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Exhibit 2
DEA Illustration
Pure Technical and Scale Efﬁciency
In Exhibit 2, the vertical axis represents output and the horizontal axis represents
input combinations (X) that contain an equal amount of both input 1 and input 2.
Movement to the right along the horizontal axis requires a proportional increase in
both inputs. The graph shows three observations denoted a, b and c, respectively. Here
two frontiers are illustrated, a constant returns frontier obe, and a variable returns
frontier gbah. To measure PTE, an examination of the variable frontier must take
place. For c, PTE is equal to the ratio of input usage assuming variable returns to
scale to the actual input usage (i.e., ƒj/ƒc). SE is equal to the ratio of the TE measure
assuming constant returns to scale (ƒk/ƒc) to the technical efﬁciency measure
assuming variable return to scale (ƒj/ƒc), (i.e., ƒk/ƒj). In other words, SE 5 TE/PTE.
If the SE measure equals one, the ﬁrm is operating at constant returns to scale. If SE
does not equal one, then the ﬁrm is either operating in a range of increasing or
decreasing returns to scale. To determine the nature of the returns to scale when SE
does not equal one, we need to calculate the TE measure assuming nonincreasing




1 yX 1 2 X5
2 y1,y2 X1 2 X5
3 yX 1 2 X4
4 y1,y2 X1 2 X4
Note: Models 1 and 2 have associated input prices of p1–p5, and Models 3 and 4 have associated
input prices of p1–p4.
Output and Inputs:
y 5 Total revenue transactions
y1 5 Sales transactions
y2 5 Listing transactions
X1 5 Number of sales personnel
X2 5 Number of nonsales employees
X3 5 Number of ofﬁces
X4 5 Advertising and promotion expenses
X5 5 Other expenses
In sum, OE 5 AE*TE or equivalently OE 5 AE*PTE*SE since SE 5 TE/PTE. This
shows that sources of operational inefﬁciency may be due to some combination of an
incorrect input mix (allocational inefﬁciency), a nonoptimal production scale (scale
inefﬁciency), or underutilization of inputs (pure technical inefﬁciency) The Appendix
provides a formal mathematical treatment of these efﬁciency measures.
The Data
The data employed to estimate the efﬁciency scores were obtained from the
Economics and Research Division of the National Association of Realtors. They
conduct periodic nationwide surveys of the real estate brokerage industry. The current
data come from the sixth survey, which encompasses 1990–91.7 The information was
obtained from professionals who are Certiﬁed Real Estate Brokerage Manager
designees and a random selection of members of the National Association of Realtors.8
A census of all the data for residential (a ﬁrm was termed residential if 75% of its
revenue transaction were from residential dealings) real estate ﬁrms was obtained.
With adjustment for incomplete and missing data, the ﬁnal data set contains 276 ﬁrms.
To make sure that the results obtained are robust to model speciﬁcations, four models
with different input-output combinations were constructed. In Exhibit 3, Models (1)
and (2) contain ﬁve inputs: the number of salespersons, the number of nonsales
employees, the number of ofﬁces, promotion and advertising expenses, and other
inputs which is proxied by other expenses. Model (1) deﬁnes only one output, the
number of revenue transactions. Model (2) decomposes revenue transactions into sales146 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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Exhibit 4
Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Y 764 1,638 26 21,275
y1 376 817 9 10,642
y2 392 834 10 10,633
X1 60 130 1 1,472
X2 16 33 1 350
X3 4 14 1 225
X4 176,124 416,442 2,490 4,818,769
X5 231,580 410,860 8,018 3,445,090
p1 25,690 13,785 2,156 127,100
p2 14,099 8,333 1,143 55,000
p3 42,414 35,296 1,725 254,000
p4 269 285 40 3,896
p5 414 467 30 4,506
y 5 Total revenue transactions
y1 5 Sales transactions
y2 5 Listing transactions
X1 5 Number of sales personnel
X2 5 Number of nonsales employees
X3 5 Number of ofﬁces
X4 5 Advertising and promotion expenses
X5 5 Other expenses
P1 5 Price of sales personnel
P2 5 Price of nonsales employees
P3 5 Price of an ofﬁce
P4 5 Price of advertising and promotion
P5 5 Price of other inputs
and listings. Models (3) and (4) are parallel to Models (1) and (2) except that other
inputs are excluded.
The price of a salesperson was computed by dividing total sales-related expenses by
the number of full-time equivalent salespersons. The price of nonsales labor was
calculated by dividing clerical, secretarial and sales managers’ salaries by the number
of nonsales employees. The price of ofﬁces was calculated by dividing total occupancy
expense by the number of real estate ofﬁces. The last two prices, advertising and
promotion and other inputs are expressed as a percentage of revenue transactions.
Summary statistics for the inputs, outputs, and input prices are given in Exhibit 4.MEASURING THE EFFICIENCY OF RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE FIRMS 147
Exhibit 5










OE 0.16 0.12 0.18 0.13 0.25 0.17 0.27 0.19
AE 0.40 0.14 0.34 0.14 0.68 0.22 0.52 0.19
TE 0.41 0.23 0.54 0.24 0.38 0.22 0.52 0.24
PTE 0.82 0.27 0.85 0.24 0.82 0.27 0.84 0.25
SE 0.54 0.27 0.66 0.26 0.50 0.26 0.65 0.26
OE 5 Overall Efﬁciency
AE 5 Allocative Efﬁciency
TE 5 Technical Efﬁciency
PTE 5 Pure Technical Efﬁciency
SE 5 Scale Efﬁciency
Efﬁciency Estimation Results
The ﬁve efﬁciency measures, OE, AE, TE, PTE and SE are computed for the model
speciﬁcations. Their mean values and standard deviations are summarized in Exhibit
5. Overall efﬁciency scores are very low, regardless of which model is estimated, as
evidenced by mean efﬁciency scores of less than .3.
The low overall efﬁciency levels are driven by both technical and allocative
inefﬁciencies. AE scores range from approximately 34% to 68% and TE scores range
from 38% to 54%. Division of the TE measure into PTE and SE levels, however,
reveals that most of the technical inefﬁciencies are scale in nature. SE measures only
range from 50% to 66%, while the PTE scores, which measure utilization of employed
inputs, all exceed 80%. This implies that employing an improper input mix hampers
ﬁrm performance more than poor input utilization.
Further analysis of the SE measures shows that most of the sample ﬁrms are not
operating under constant returns to scale. To summarize, the number of ﬁrms that
operated under increasing, constant and decreasing returns to scale are reported in
Exhibit 6. The majority of ﬁrms show increasing returns to scale. In particular, more
than 70% were operating in the range of increasing returns to scale in each model.
These results are consistent with the ﬁndings of Zumpano, Elder and Crellin (1993)
and Zumpano and Elder (1994) who found that the real estate brokerage industry is
characterized by the existence of many small ﬁrms that failed to capture the beneﬁts
of expanding the scale and scope of their operations. These results also help explain
the growth in average ﬁrm size that has occurred over the last decade. Faced with a
mature market, growth in ﬁrm size and market share can only be accomplished in
many cases through consolidation by way of mergers and acquisitions. The small
ﬁrms that remain are being increasingly forced into niche markets, or providing what148 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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Exhibit 6
Economies of Scale
Model CRS IRS DRS
1 14 219 43
2 20 213 42
3 12 224 40
4 16 216 44
CRS 5 Constant Returns to Scale
IRS 5 Increasing Returns to Scale
DRS 5 Decreasing Returns to Scale
may be higher cost services to limited segments of the market; the growth in buyer
agencies is a good example.
The low efﬁciency scores for the residential brokerage industry could also reﬂect other
factors that have nothing to do with the industry; in particular, the methodology used
in the estimation of efﬁciency measures. The data envelopment analysis technique
used here assumes that any deviation from the efﬁcient frontier represents inefﬁciency.
If there are several ﬁrms that are extremely efﬁcient, the resulting average efﬁciency
score for the sample would be very low. Thus, some of the ﬁndings could reﬂect
measurement problems. To investigate this problem, the efﬁciency scores were
computed multiple times by deleting the most efﬁcient and/or the most inefﬁcient
ﬁrms. No matter which ﬁrms were deleted, the results were virtually identical.
Although this does not mean there is not a problem, it does increase conﬁdence in
our estimations.
The results obtained from the data envelopment analysis are sensitive to model
speciﬁcation. The Spearman Rank Correlation test was conducted to determine if the
different input-output speciﬁcations yielded signiﬁcantly different efﬁciency scores.
Results are reported in Exhibit 7 and indicate that the efﬁciency scores of the different
models are all signiﬁcantly related to each other.
Firm Characteristics and Efﬁciency Measures
It is of interest to know how ﬁrm and/or market characteristics are related to the
various efﬁciency measures. To explain possible determinants of OE, the following
regression model is estimated:
EFF 5 B 1 BS I Z E1 B FRAN 1 BD E N S E1 BA G E i 01 2 3 4
1 B FIXED 1 B BAL 1 BM L S1 B FIRMTYPE 1 e , (1) 56 7 8 i
The dependent variable, EFFi, represents ﬁrm i’s efﬁciency score (either OE, AE,
TE, PTE or SE). SIZE is a variable representing ﬁrm size. It is expressed as the logMEASURING THE EFFICIENCY OF RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE FIRMS 149
Exhibit 7
Spearman’s Correlation Coefﬁcients for Efﬁciency Measures by Model
Panel A: Overall Efﬁciency

















Panel B: Allocative Efﬁciency

















Panel C: Overall Technical Efﬁciency

















Panel D: Pure Technical Efﬁciency
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Exhibit 7 (continued)
Spearman’s Correlation Coefﬁcients for Efﬁciency Measures by Model
Panel E: Scale Efﬁciency

















Note: The numbers following the efﬁciency abbreviations denote the model under consideration.
of total revenue transactions. Previous studies by Zumpano, Elder and Crellin (1993)
and Zumpano and Elder (1994) both suggest that ﬁrms in this market are too small
to operate efﬁciently. In addition, our results indicate that, on average, ﬁrms in this
market could increase their performance levels by expanding the scale of their
production. Therefore, ﬁrm size is expected to have a positive effect on operational
efﬁciency.
FRAN is a dummy variable taking on a value of one if the ﬁrm is franchised and zero
othersie. Franchsing may reﬂect efﬁciency considerations for several reasons. Early
franchising theory suggested that a franchised ﬁrm could raise capital at a lower cost
than traditional ﬁrms.9 If this is true, the franchised ﬁrms would be more efﬁcient.
Furthermore, the rental of an established name could help a ﬁrm’s reputation and
selling power, which would increase efﬁciency. Moreover, the structure of franchises
leads to a lower probability of quality debasing since the franchise could be terminated
if certain standards are not met. Lastly, if advertising and promotion are more
efﬁciently handled at the national level, but production and distribution at the local
level, franchising may prove to be an efﬁcient form of business.
However, it is possible that franchising could reduce efﬁciency. For instance, if several
other franchisees provide poorer services or inferior products, a high quality-producing
ﬁrm could still be associated with lower standards. Moreover, franchised ﬁrms may
feel as if they can ‘‘ride’’ on their franchisor’s reputation and shirk on quality and
customer service. Finally, the payments to the parent company, by increasing variable
costs, may also hurt proﬁts to a greater extent than the potential increase in
incremental revenues that may result from franchising.
DENSE, the market population per salesperson variable, is used as a proxy for market
density. In markets with greater population density, there should be more properties
to list and sell in close proximity to the ﬁrm. This should reduce transportation costs,
increase the effectiveness of advertising and decrease the time costs in the listing andMEASURING THE EFFICIENCY OF RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE FIRMS 151
selling process. In addition, in many large metropolitan areas, there exist many real
estate ﬁrms. Hence, there should be greater competition, which would tend to increase
efﬁciency levels.
AGE represents the number of years a ﬁrm has been operating. Older ﬁrms may be
able to obtain more listings and/or make more sales than their new ﬁrm counterparts
because of reputation and accumulated brandname capital effects. However, it is
possible that older, more established ﬁrms may attempt to ‘‘ride’’ on their established
reputation and not utilize the resources they have available.
FIXED is the proportion of ﬁxed costs to total ﬁrm costs and is a measure of operating
leverage. Operating leverage greatly impacts a ﬁrm’s business risk level. If a ﬁrm has
an extremely high level of ﬁxed costs, a small decline in sales can lead to a substantial
decline in returns. Conversely, a small increase in sales would greatly enhance the
proﬁtability.10 The ex ante hypothesis is that market conditions may dictate the
relationship of this variable with the efﬁciency measures.
BAL is a dummy variable with a value of one if the ﬁrm produces a balanced output
of sales and listings and zero otherwise. A ﬁrm is assumed to produce a balanced
output of sales and listing if no less than 40% and no more than 60% of their total
output comes from sales. BAL is expected to be positively related with efﬁciency as
Zumpano and Elder (1994) found signiﬁcant economies of scope in this sector.
MLS is a dummy variable taking on a value of one if the ﬁrm belongs to more than
one MLS and a value of zero otherwise. Zumpano and Hooks (1988) suggest that the
MLS increases rather than decreases efﬁciency. This is evident by the fact that over
98% of the ﬁrms in the sample set belong to at least one MLS. However, here the
number of MLS afﬁliations is tested in order to determine if the marginal beneﬁts of
joining an additional MLS are co-measurate with the costs.
FIRMTYPE is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the ﬁrm is a corporation
and zero otherwise. According to agency theory, ﬁrm type may impact efﬁciency
levels. For sole proprietorships and partnerships, the owner/managers have unlimited
personal liability. In a corporation, owner/mangers are not exposed to personal
liability for the debts of the company. Moreover, the manger may not be a direct
residual claimant. Hence, agency theory would predict that a corporation would be
more inefﬁcient than either the sole proprietorship or the partnership (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976).
Regression Results11
As shown in Exhibit 8, ﬁrm size (SIZE) is positively and signiﬁcantly related with all
efﬁciency measures except PTE. The result is consistent with the ﬁndings of Zumpano,
Elder and Crellin (1993) and Zumpano and Elder (1994) in that most residential real
estate brokerage ﬁrms are too small to operate efﬁciently. The negative coefﬁcient on
PTE suggests that input utilization decreases as ﬁrm size increases. This result is
consistent with agency theory. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that as ﬁrms grow,152 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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Exhibit 8
Regression Results for the One Output–Five Input Model



























































































ADJ-R2 .1307 .0723 .1253 .2300 .2431
*Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
**Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
***Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
The dependent variables are: SIZE 5 ﬁrm size measured as the log of total revenue transactions,
FRAN 5 1 if the ﬁrm is franchised and 0 otherwise, DENSE 5 market density, AGE 5 the age of
the ﬁrm in years, FIXED 5 ﬁxed costs as a percentage of total costs, BAL 5 1 if sales transactions
account for 40–60% of total revenue transactions and 0 otherwise, MLS 5 the number of multiple
listings services that a ﬁrm subscribes and FIRMTYPE 5 1 if the ﬁrm is a corporation and 0
otherwise.
monitoring employee productivity becomes increasingly difﬁcult and expensive.
Hence, input utilization is negatively related to size. However, the SE component
dominates the PTE measure and, as such, the TE and OE measures suggest that
performance can be improved by increasing ﬁrm size.
All of the FRAN coefﬁcients are negative and signiﬁcant except when PTE is the
dependent variable. For PTE, the franchising coefﬁcient is positive but insigniﬁcant.
The results are consistent with that found by Bates (1995). Bates found that franchised
ﬁrms were poorer performers and had lower survival rates than their non-franchised
counterparts.
The number of MLS services that a ﬁrm subscribes is signiﬁcantly related to all of
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increases AE, but decreases all other efﬁciency measures. It appears that employing
a MLS promotes optimal input mix. However, ﬁrms seem to have excessive MLS
memberships. Overall, the results suggest that the marginal beneﬁts of joining an
additional MLS are not co-measurate with the costs.12
The operating leverage variable, FIXED, is negatively related to OE, AE and PTE.
There is no signiﬁcant relationship between FIXED and overall TE and TE measures.
The overall negative impact of this variable may be due to relatively sluggish real
estate growth in 1990.
Producing a balanced output was found to be related to TE. However, the overall TE
variable is insigniﬁcant due to the opposing signs of the PTE and SE measures. The
production of a balanced output reduces PTE, but increases SE. These results are
intuitively appealing. The production of a balanced output reduces utilization gains
related to specialization and thus PTE suffers. However, the ability to both sell and
list allows for more expansion opportunities which promotes SE.
The AGE variable is only signiﬁcant with respect to PTE. The variable is signiﬁcant
and negatively related to PTE. This suggests that input utilization suffers as ﬁrms
become older. Older ﬁrms are positively correlated with size. The correlation
coefﬁcient is .157. and the agency problems noted earlier may be driving the results.
Finally, the density of the market and the ﬁrm type variables were shown to be
insigniﬁcant in all regressions.
Conclusion
This article employed the DEA to a set of residential real estate brokerage ﬁrms in
order to measure their relative efﬁciency levels. Five different efﬁciency measures
were used. The results are signiﬁcant and provide much needed information on the
efﬁciency characteristics of this market. PTE for the sampled ﬁrms was very high and
comparable to that obtained for ﬁnancial institutions in previous empirical studies.
However, the OE scores are very low. The low efﬁciency scores are mainly attributable
to allocative and scale inefﬁciencies. Most of the sample ﬁrms are too small to capture
the cost savings associated with larger scale operations. From the regression analysis,
ﬁrm size, franchising, operating leverage and the number of MLSs were signiﬁcantly
related to the OE levels. In particular, ﬁrm size is positively related to overall
efﬁciency levels while choosing to franchise, adding an additional MLS and increasing
operating leverage are all associated with poorer ﬁrm performance. Lastly, market
density and ﬁrm type are not signiﬁcantly related to any of the efﬁciency measures.
Appendix
Overall, Technical and Allocative Efﬁciencies
The efﬁciency measures can also be stated more formally. OE is deﬁned as the ratio
of the best practice ﬁrm’s production cost to the actual cost of a particular ﬁrm. As154 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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previously mentioned, OE can be decomposed as the product of technical efﬁciency
and allocative efﬁciency, i.e., OE 5 TE * AE, or equivalently, OE 5 AE*PTE*SE.
To estimate OE for a particular ﬁrm, say j, the following linear program is employed:
Min Px (1)
s.t. (2) y # ZY j
x $ ZX (3) j
Z [ R (4)
Here, yj is a m31 vector of outputs produced by ﬁrm j; xj is a n31 vector of inputs
utilized by the ﬁrm and P i sa1 * n vector of input prices. Y is a K3m matrix of ﬁrm
outputs where K is the number of ﬁrms in the sample. X is a K3n matrix of inputs
and Z is a vector of weights attached to each ﬁrm when constructing hypothetical
efﬁcient ﬁrms.
For demonstration purposes, a detailed form of the above program for a one output
(y) and two inputs (X1 and X2) model with k sample ﬁrms is given below:
Min px 1 px 11 22
123 k s.t. y # Zy 1 Zy 1 Zy 1 ... 1 Zy j 123 k
123 k x $ Zx 1 Zx 1 Zx 1 ... 1 Zx 1j 11 21 31 k 1
123 k x $ Zx 1 Zx 1 Zx 1 ... 1 Zx 2j 12 22 32 k 2
Z , Z , Z ,..., Z [ R 123 k
Equations (2) and (3) are the output and input constraints, respectively. The purposes
of the constraints are to construct an efﬁcient frontier to which an individual ﬁrm is
compared. To identify efﬁcient ﬁrms, the program examines all linear combinations
of sample ﬁrms that produce an output equal to or greater than that produced by ﬁrm
j (Equation 2) and use no more than the input used by ﬁrm j (Equation 3). The linear
combination that has the lowest production cost is the best practice ﬁrm. The solution
represents the minimum cost level that an individual ﬁrm should achieve given its
output. Dividing the minimum cost by the cost of ﬁrm j yields the overall efﬁciency
measure for ﬁrm j.
The following linear program is used to calculate technical efﬁciency:
Min TE (5)
s.t. y # ZY (6) j
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Z [ R (8)
TE is the ratio of inputs utilized by the best practice ﬁrm to the inputs actually utilized
by ﬁrm j. Therefore, if ﬁrm j is efﬁcient, TE 5 1. When TE , 1, ﬁrm j can reduce
its input usage without reducing its outputs. Efﬁcient ﬁrms are constructed by a
process similar to that stated in the program for calculating OE. Efﬁcient ﬁrms are
linear combinations of sample ﬁrms that produce output equal to or greater than that
produced by ﬁrm j (Equation 6) and uses no more than TE percent of input used by
ﬁrm j (Equation 7). Within a set of efﬁcient ﬁrms, the program chooses the
combination that minimizes TE. The solution to this minimization problem is the
efﬁcient index for ﬁrm j. Refer to Exhibit 1, TE for ﬁrm C equals ob/oc.
The measures of PTE and SE can be shown mathematically. First, PTE is derived by
the following linear program:
Min PTE (9)
s.t. y # ZY (10) j
PTEx $ ZX (11) j
o z 5 1 (12) i
Z [ R (13)
The only difference between the program for calculating TE and that for PTE lies on
the constraints on the vector Z. Equation (12) allows for variable returns to scale. As
previously mentioned, SE is obtained by dividing TE by PTE. In order to determine
the nature of the returns to scale when SE Þ 1, another linear program must be solved.
This program constructs a frontier that allows for non-increasing returns to scale. This
frontier can be calculated by the following linear program:
Min s (14)
s.t. y # ZY (15) j
sx $ ZX (16) j
o z # 1 (17) i
Z [ R (18)
Equation (17) allows for non-increasing returns to scale. It can be shown that when
SE Þ 1, decreasing return to scale exist if s 5 PTE, and increasing returns to scale
exist if s Þ PTE (see Fa ¨re, Grosskopt and Lovell, 1985).
Notes
1 Or at least, the studies assume that all ﬁrms deviate from the efﬁcient frontier by the same
magnitude.156 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
VOLUME 16, NUMBER 2, 1998
2 The cartel hypothesis was supported by Maurizi’s (1974) study, but was rejected by Shillings
and Sirmans (1985) and Johnson and Loucks (1986).
3 Examples of such studies include Christensen and Greene (1976) on electric power generation,
Caves, Christensen and Swanson (1981) on the railroad industry, McKay (1988) on the nursing
home industry and Darrough and Heinke (1978) on law enforcement agencies. Additionally,
many studies on economies of scale and scope exist in banking and will be noted later.
4 Leibenstein (1966) argued that X-inefﬁciency losses should be substantial in any industry.
Hence, obtaining a measure of X-inefﬁciency is important for all sectors such that the true
structure and performance of the market can be gleaned.
5 If managers and/or workers can be encouraged or persuaded to work more effectively, ﬁrms
could improve performance without changing their resource allocation. If a ﬁrm is operating in
a competitive market, managers and workers may feel more pressure to work more efﬁciently.
6 This method is derived from an engineering ratio concept for measuring efﬁciency. However,
the engineering efﬁciency ratio was only capable of measuring efﬁciency for the case of a single
input and a single output.
7 Most of the respondents reported income and expenses for the year ending December 31,
1990. However, some of the ﬁrms operate on a ﬁscal year that carried into 1991. Hence, the
data comes from both 1990 and 1991.
8 A sample of the NAR survey questionnaire is available from the authors upon request.
9 For representative studies see Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1969), Oxenfeldt and Thompson (1969),
Ozanne and Hunt (1971) and Caves and Murphey (1976).
10 In order to speculate on how operating leverage may alter proﬁts, the degree of total risk,
which includes ﬁnancial risk, needs to be calculated. Firms could trade high levels of operating
leverage for low levels of ﬁnancial leverage. Thus, in economic upturns, the ﬁrms with high
operating leverage may not be able to translate the increased revenues into proﬁts. Unfortunately,
the data set is insufﬁcient to measure ﬁnancial risk. However, ﬁnancial risk is proxied by the
ratio of interest and ﬁnancing expenses to net income. Operating leverage and the proxy for
ﬁnancial leverage are slightly negatively correlated. However, when they are regressed against
one another, no statistically signiﬁcant relationship is found. Hence, it is reasonable to assume
that ﬁrms with higher operating leverage have higher levels of total risk and vice versa.
11 As the regression results using efﬁciency measures based on different input/output deﬁnitions
are similar, only the results for Model 1 are reported here.
12 This result does not necessarliy contradict Zumpano and Hooks (1988) who suggested that
the use of a MLS increases efﬁciency levels. Over 98% of the sampled ﬁrms belonged to at
least one MLS. The results presented here show that adding another MLS may reduce efﬁciency
levels. However, no claim is made as to whether the decision to belong verses the decison not
to belong to an MLS alters efﬁciency levels.
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